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Background: The behavioural symptoms of autism spectrum disorder (ASD) are thought to reflect underlying
cognitive deficits/differences. The findings in the literature are somewhat mixed regarding the cognitive features of
ASD. This study attempted to address this issue by investigating a range of cognitive deficits and the prevalence of
multiple cognitive atypicalities in a large population-based sample comprising children with ASD, their unaffected
co-twins, and typically developing comparison children. Methods: Participants included families from the Twins
Early Development Study (TEDS) where one or both children met diagnostic criteria for ASD. Overall, 181
adolescents with a diagnosis of ASD and 73 unaffected co-twins were included, plus an additional 160 comparison
control participants. An extensive cognitive battery was administered to measure IQ, central coherence, executive
function, and theory of mind ability. Results: Differences between groups (ASD, co-twin, control) are reported on
tasks assessing theory of mind, executive function, and central coherence. The ASD group performed atypically in
significantly more cognitive tasks than the unaffected co-twin and control groups. Nearly a third of the ASD group
presented with multiple cognitive atypicalities. Conclusions: Multiple cognitive atypicalities appear to be a
characteristic, but not universal feature, of ASD. Further work is needed to investigate whether specific cognitive
atypicalities, either alone or together, are related to specific behaviours characteristic of ASD. Keywords: Autism
spectrum disorder, cognition, theory of mind, executive function, weak central coherence.
Introduction
Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is a developmental
disorder characterised by impaired social interaction
and communication, and restricted and repetitive
patterns of behaviour and interests (RRBIs) (Amer-
ican Psychiatric Association, 2013). These behavio-
ural symptoms are thought to reflect underlying
cognitive deficits/differences, which have been
extensively researched (see Brunsdon & Happe, for
review). Findings to date have been somewhat mixed,
perhaps due to methodological factors and the
inherent heterogeneity within the autism spectrum.
This study attempts to address this issue by inves-
tigating a range of cognitive atypicalities in a large
population-based sample comprising children with
ASD, their co-twins, and typically developing com-
parison children (termed ‘controls’).
Cognitive accounts of ASD can be broadly divided
into domain-specific and domain-general theories.
Domain-specific theories situate the primary deficit
in social processing. Prominent amongst these is the
‘Theory of Mind’ (ToM) deficit account, which
explains the social and communication impairments
of ASD as resulting from difficulty representing
mental states (e.g. Frith, Morton, & Leslie, 1991).
This account has been influential in psychological
research, neuroimaging and intervention, although
the universality and specificity of ToM deficits has
been questioned (Yirmiya, Erel, Shaked, & Solomon-
ica-Levi, 1998). Whether ToM deficits are primary or
result from earlier abnormalities of social orienting
or social motivation, is also a topic of much debate
(Dawson, Webb, & McPartland, 2005; Jones, Carr, &
Klin, 2008).
Domain-general accounts of ASD propose that the
primary deficit/difference is not in social cognition
specifically but lies in, for example, ‘executive func-
tions’ (EF; Hill, 2004). Executive dysfunction in ASD
has been proposed to underlie RRBIs due to a failure
to generate new behaviours or shift set. Executive
dysfunction has also been hypothesised to explain
social/communicative deficits (Kenworthy, Black,
Harrison, Della Rosa, & Wallace, 2009).
A number of domain-general accounts suggest
areas of superior processing or differences in cogni-
tive style, such as ‘weak central coherence’ (CC)
(Frith, 1989; Happe & Booth, 2008; Pellicano, 2010),
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a bias towards featural processing and reduced
configural processing. Superior local processing,
but accompanied by intact global processing, is also
proposed by ‘enhanced perceptual processing’ (Mot-
tron, Dawson, Soulieres, Hubert, & Burack, 2006),
‘systemising’ (Simon Baron-Cohen, 2009) and
enhanced discrimination (O’Riordan & Plaisted,
2001) accounts of ASD.
Traditionally, cognitive accounts of ASD have
attempted to explain parsimoniously both sociocom-
municative impairments and RRBIs as resulting from
a single underlying deficit/difference. However, more
recently it has been suggested that multiple cognitive
accounts may apply, with each explaining distinct
symptoms of ASD (Brunsdon & Happe, 2014; Happe
& Ronald, 2008; Happe, Ronald, & Plomin, 2006).
Thus, ASD might be seen as the result of a combina-
tion of cognitive deficits or atypicalities, with ToM
deficits explaining sociocommunicative features,
executive dysfunction explaining RRBIs, and detail-
focus (e.g. CC) explaining uneven cognitive profile
and assets. Previous work has been limited in its
scope to examine this hypothesis as most studies
have investigated a single cognitive domain, with the
noteable exceptions of studies by Pellicano (Pellican-
o, 2013; Pellicano, Maybery, Durkin, & Maley, 2006)
and Charman et al. (2011).
The aim of this study was to address the mixed
findings in the literature regarding the cognitive
features of ASD and to investigate the prevalence of
multiple cognitive atypicalities in ASD. Previous stud-
ies, which have reported mixed findings, have typi-
cally had sample sizes of 15 to 40 individuals with
ASD, and have often given tests of only one area of
cognition. We aimed to test weak CC, EF and ToM in
the same large sample of individuals with ASD.Mixed
findings may also reflect differences in sample selec-
tion and recruitment (e.g. through specialist clinics,
special schools, parent volunteers). We therefore
tested a population-based sample, identified asmeet-
ing diagnostic criteria for ASD from a longitudinal
studyof all twinsborn in theUnitedKingdom in1994–
6. In addition, we assessed along with the ASD twins,
their unaffected cotwins, who may be expected to
share some (subclinical) traits or cognitive character-
istics, according to family studies of the ‘broader
autism phenotype’ (e.g. Hughes, Plumet, & Leboyer,
1999). Therefore, this study included individuals




Participants were part of the Twins Early Development Study
(TEDS), a population-based longitudinal study of all twins
born in the United Kingdom between 1994 and 1996. The
12,054 families involved at the start of TEDS were reported to
be representative of UK families (Haworth, Davis, & Plomin,
2013).
The Social Relationships Study (SR study) focused on those
TEDS families with one or both twins meeting diagnostic
criteria for ASD. Twins ‘at risk’ of ASD were identified a) from a
parental report of an ASD diagnosis directly to TEDS (via
phone at any point or by ticking boxes about diagnoses on
postal questionnaires) and/or b) elevated scores on the Child-
hood Autism Spectrum Test (CAST) (Scott, Baron-Cohen,
Bolton, & Brayne, 2002) at age 8 (data available from 6,736
TEDS families). Two hundred and eleven families reported a
previous ASD diagnosis in at least one twin, and an additional
203 families had at least one child who scored above cut-off for
suspected ASD on the CAST (≥15). Of these 414 families, 326
families were contactable and consented to take part in the
second stage of screening. To address possible selection bias
and selective attrition in TEDS, a mail-out to child psychia-
trists across the United Kingdom and advertisements through
the National Autistic Society and the Twins and Multiple Births
Association, were carried out to find any additional twin pairs
with ASD born between 1994 and 1996. This yielded an
additional five twin pairs. Using the ASD module, families
completed the Development and Wellbeing Assessment (DAW-
BA) (Goodman, Ford, Richards, Gatward, & Meltzer, 2000) via
a telephone interview. This identified 235 families with at least
one child who met DAWBA criteria for an ASD and so were
invited to take part in the SR study. Informed parental consent
was obtained from 129 families to complete a home visit,
including diagnostic and cognitive testing; other families were
not traceable or did not consent to in-person assessments. The
129 families who took part were comparable to those eligible
for participation (i.e. CAST≥ 15 or suspected ASD) but who did
not take part, CAST score (p = .14), socioeconomic status
(p = .25) and zygosity (p = .23), but more girls were in the ‘high
CAST/suspected ASD group’ (36%) than the final sample (17%)
(Colvert et al., 2014). Twins in the ASD families who did not
meet criteria for ASD comprised the ‘unaffected cotwin’ group
in the following analyses.
Information regarding the ascertainment and diagnostic
classification procedure can be found in Colvert et al. (2014).
Participants were diagnosed with ASD using gold-standard
diagnostic instruments; the Autism Diagnostic Interview-
Revised (ADI-R; Lord, Rutter, & Lecouteur, 1994) and the
Autism Diagnostic Schedule (ADOS; Lord et al., 2000). Addi-
tional cut-offs devised by the Autism Genetic Resource
Exchange (AGRE)were implemented to identify familymembers
with more subtle ASD symptoms and assigned cases to ‘ASD’
(AGRE categories Autism and ‘Not Quite Autism’), ‘Broad
Spectrum Disorder’, and ‘unaffected’. A ‘broad spectrum’ diag-
nosis was permitted for the ADOS and corresponded to just
below cut-off for diagnostic criteria for an ASD on the ADOS (2
points). Participants were classified using available information
(ADI-R, ADOS, DAWBA). In 37% of the ASD sample (N = 89), the
ADI-Rand theADOSclassificationswere inconsistent. For these
cases,diagnostic consensuswasreachedbya teamof clinicians.
One twin pair was excluded from analyses since neither twin
reacheddiagnostic cut-off forASD,butCASTscore>12rendered
them unsuitable for inclusion in the control sample. Children
were also excluded if there were known circumstances likely to
affect the accuracy of diagnosis (N = 2). For current analyses,
ASDdiagnosesandbroadspectrumdiagnoseswerecombined to
create one ASD group to cover the complete autism spectrum
from severely impaired individuals through to those with more
subtle impairments. In the ASD group, 141 adolescents were
diagnosed with ASD and 40 adolescents met the definition for a
broad spectrumdiagnosis. An unaffected cotwin groupwas also
created consisting of 73 cotwins without an ASD or broad
spectrum diagnosis.
A comparison control sample with CAST scores less than 12
was recruited via TEDS and matched to the ASD sample on
gender, age, IQ, social economic status and zygosity. 80
control twin pairs were recruited, making a total of 209
families visited in their homes by a team of two trained
researchers.
© 2014 The Authors. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Association for
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The ASD group contained 181 adolescents (13 years
6 months; 150 males), the unaffected cotwin group contained
73 adolescents (13 years 6 months; 27 males) and the control
group contained 160 adolescents (12 years, 10 months; 110
males). Table 1 provides further information regarding the age,
IQ, gender, zygosity, ADI and ADOS scores of the ASD, cotwin,
and control group.
There was a significant difference between groups (ASD,
cotwins, control) in age (F(2,411) = 32.20, p < .001, g2 = .135).
Tukey post-hoc tests revealed that the control group was
significantly younger than both the ASD and cotwin groups
(p < .001). There were significant differences in IQ across
groups (F(2,411) = 28.23, p < .001, g2 = .121). Overall, the
ASD group (M = 90.02) had a significantly lower IQ score than
both the cotwin group (M = 104.76, p < .001) and the control
group (M = 101.91, p < .001). There were no significant differ-
ences in IQ scores between the co-twin and control groups
(p = .476).
Measures
Intellectual ability. Intellectual ability was assessed
using the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI)
(Wechsler, 1999) to obtain an estimated score for IQ. Fourteen
nonverbal adolescents completed the Raven’s Coloured Pro-
gressive Matrices (Raven, Raven, & Court, 1998) and the
British Picture Vocabulary Scales-Revised (BPVS) (Dunn,
Dunn, Whetton, & Pintillie, 1997) to obtain an estimated score
for verbal and performance IQ. To include the low IQ individ-
uals in the subsequent analyses, the 14 nonverbal children
were given a provisional WASI full-scale IQ score of 49 (1 point
below the lowest possible score on the WASI). This study used
the Block Design subtest as a measure of CC. Therefore, the
two-subtest version of the WASI (includes Matrix Reasoning
and Vocabulary) was used as an estimate of IQ.
Cognitive task battery. The measures (with the targeted
components), key variables, number of trials, and reference to
procedure are shown in Table 2.
Procedure
Home visits were made to all ASD and control families by two
trained researchers. The ASD families completed two home
visits, which lasted approximately 6 hr in total. The ASD
families completed gold standard diagnostic assessments; the
ADOS (Lord et al., 2000) and the ADI-R (Lord et al., 1994). The
control families completed one home visit, which lasted
approximately 2 hr. Both the ASD and control families com-
pleted an extensive cognitive battery to measure IQ, language
ability, CC, executive function (EF) and ToM ability. The
batteries were administered in a counterbalanced order with
two fixed orders of tasks. A different experimenter assessed
each participant within the twin pair in order to reduce
possible experimenter bias.
Results
All twins were treated as singletons in the present
analyses to allow comparisons between groups of
adolescents with ASD (termed ASD group), unaf-
fected cotwins, and a control group. The reaction
time from Embedded Figures Test (EFT), total error
score in the Sentence Completion Task, the coher-
ence score and planning score from the Planning
Drawing Task, reversal errors in ID/ED, and errors
in Penny Hiding Game were reflected so that a higher
score indicated better performance in all tasks.
Preliminary data analyses indicated that some of
the data did not meet assumptions of a normal
distribution. Data from six of the cognitive measures
were skewed (value > 2) and data from four of the
cognitive measures had a leptokurtic distribution
(value > 3). All variables were normalised using a
Van der Waerden transformation.
Pearson’s correlation analyses were carried out to
investigate if age and IQ were related to performance
on cognitive measures. For all groups, age was not
significantly correlated with cognitive measures,
except for Block Design Task performance in the
ASD and control groups (ASD: r = .24, p < .01,
controls: r = .44, p < .001). In the ASD group, IQ
was significantly related to performance on most
cognitive measures (12/13, all rs > .21, all ps < .01),
except for Homographs Reading Test (r = .14,
p = .094). Correlational analyses revealed fewer sig-
nificant relationships between IQ and performance
on cognitive measures for the unaffected cotwin
group (2/13 measures) and the control group (4/
13) as compared to the ASD group. Therefore, IQ-
Table 1 Participant characteristics
ASD Unaffected Cotwins (CT) Controls (TD)
Sig.
N M (SD) Range N M (SD) Range N M (SD) Range p
Age (years) 181 13.49 (0.69) 12.08–16.25 73 13.50 (0.65) 12.25–15.17 160 12.79 (1.10) 10.92–15.58 <.001
IQ (WASI
2-subtest)
153 94.07 (16.91) 55–128 71 104.76 (13.73) 61–130 158 102.00 (15.19) 56–142 <.001
IQ (imputed
score)
181 90.02 (20.34) 49–128 73 104.76 (13.54) 61–130 160 101.91 (15.14) 56–142 <.001
ADOS total
(raw)a
174 11.38 (6.14) 0–26 71 1.83 (2.23) 0–10 – – – <.001
ADI totala 177 37.64 (16.19) 3–70 72 5.46 (5.03) 0–23 – – – <.001
Males:
Females
4.84:1 1.70:1 2.20:1 <.001
MZ:DZ 1:2.55 1:23.33 1:1.86 .002
ASD, autism spectrum disorder; CT, unaffected cotwins; DZ, dizygotic twin pairs; M, mean average; MZ, monozygotic pairs; N,
number of participants; SD, standard deviation; TD, typically developing controls.
aHigher score = more severe.
© 2014 The Authors. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Association for
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adjusted standardised residuals for cognitive task
performance were used in all further analyses
(unless otherwise stated). The standardised residu-
als for the ASD and cotwin group are obtained from
the regression line fit when fitting each cognitive
measure as a dependent variable in a linear model
with IQ as a predictor variable, according to the
control group (Thomas et al., 2009).
Table 3 shows the mean performance (raw scores)
for each CC, EF, and ToM measure by group. One-
way analyses of variance (ANOVA) to investigate
group differences (ASD, cotwins, controls) in cogni-
tive task performance are reported in Table 3, with
post hoc comparisons using Tukey tests. Figure 1
shows the mean performance of the ASD group and
the unaffected cotwin group relative to the control
group on all cognitive measures.
Due to the heterogeneity in cognitive performance
within the ASD group, means may not fully reflect
performance across the groups. To compare perfor-
mance further, frequencies were calculated for atyp-
ical performance on each cognitive measure.
Atypical performance was defined as one standard
deviation above (EFT and Block Design Task only) or
below (all other tasks) the control group mean. The
number of cognitive tasks on which participants
performed atypically is shown in Table 4. Results
indicated that 63% of individuals with ASD per-
formed atypically in three or more cognitive mea-
sures, compared to 31% of unaffected cotwins and
23% of controls. The ASD group performed atypically
on significantly more tasks than the unaffected
cotwin and control groups; F(2,385) = 36.28,
p < .001, g2 = .159; post hoc Tukey tests ps < .001.
The unaffected cotwin group and control group did
not differ in the number of tasks performed atypi-
cally (p = .279).
We examined how many individuals showed atyp-
icalities across the cognitive domains, by totalling the
number of participants performing one standard
deviation above (EFT and Block Design only) or below
the mean on at least one measure in each cognitive
domain. Figure 2 shows how many individuals with
ASD, unaffected cotwins and controls had no cogni-
tive atypicalities, single cognitive atypicality, dual
cognitive atypicalities, or multiple cognitive atypical-
ities. TheCCdomain showed thehighest proportion of
individuals with atypical performance solely in that
domain, perhaps due to more tasks assessing this
aspect of cognition. The most frequently cooccurring
cognitive atypicalitieswere in theCCandEFdomains.
Furthermore, there was a significant relationship
between group (ASD, unaffected cotwin, control) and
presence of multiple cognitive atypicalities (Χ2





















Shah & Frith (1983) TD > ASD
Block design task Accuracy 10 trials Shah and Frith (1993) ASD > TD
Homographs
reading test
Context effect 16 sentences Happe (1997) TD > ASD
Planning drawing
task, part A
Coherence score 2 items; house &
snowman
Booth et al. (2003) TD > ASD
Sentence completion
task
Error score 10 sentences
(plus 5 control)







3 trials; F, A, S Turner (1999) TD > ASD
Luria hand game
(inhibition)





Reversal errors 9 stages; progress
on to next stage after 8
correct trials within
50 trials.
Hughes et al. (1994) TD > ASD
Planning drawing
task, part B (planning)
Planning score 2 items; house &
snowman
Booth et al. (2003) TD > ASD
Theory of mind
Penny hiding game Error score 6 trials Baron-Cohen (1992) TD > ASD
Triangles animation task Mentalising score 4 trials; ToM only Abell, Happe, and
Frith (2000)
TD > ASD
False-belief stories First- and second-order
false-belief score
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(2) = 41.20, p < .001); the ASD group showed the
highest proportion of multiple cognitive atypicalities
(32% of ASD group) compared to the unaffected
cotwins (11%) and control groups (6%).
In the ASD group, correlation analyses indicated
that the number of cognitive atypicalities was related
to the severity of ASD symptoms (as measured by
ADOS calibrated severity scales [ADOS-CSS];
Gotham, Pickles, & Lord, 2009), r = .27, p = .001.
An ANOVA revealed a significant difference in the
severity of ASD symptoms (ADOS-CSS) according to
the number of cognitive atypicalities (none, single,
dual, multiple), F(3,153) = 3.39, p = .020, g2 = .062,
with Tukey post hoc comparisons indicating signif-
icantly more severe symptoms in ASD individuals
with multiple atypicalities (M = 6.75) compared to
ASD individuals with no cognitive atypicalities
(M = 4.50, p = .026).
Discussion
The aim of this paper was to investigate the pattern
of cognitive atypicalities in ASD in a population-
based sample to clarify the mixed findings in the
literature. Group differences on a cognitive battery
devised to assess ToM, EF and CC and the preva-
lence of multiple cognitive atypicalities were reported
for individuals with ASD, their unaffected cotwins,
and comparison typically developing individuals.
The patterns of results from the group comparisons
are discussed in this section.
The ‘weak central coherence’ account of ASD
suggests that individuals with ASD will be better at
tasks where a local processing bias is beneficial,
such as the EFT (Happe & Frith, 2006) and Block
Design Task (Shah & Frith, 1993). However, in this
study the ASD group did not significantly outperform





Cotwins (CT) Controls (TD)
Group differences
(IQ-adjusted residuals; p < .05)
ANOVA





159 20.40 (10.70) 70 17.64 (7.71) 158 17.90 (9.32) 0.31 .733 .002 n.s.
Block design
task (score)








score, max = 20)a
154 3.51 (3.02) 66 2.46 (2.64) 158 2.28 (2.49) 7.38 .001 .038 ASD > TD, CT
Planning drawing
A (coherence
score, max = 12)a








145 8.44 (2.72) 69 9.51 (1.13) 142 9.78 (0.60) 26.95 <.001 .132 TD, CT > ASD








148 0.98 (1.93) 68 0.54 (1.11) 152 0.11 (0.50) 19.04 <.001 .094 ASD > CT > TD
Triangles animation
task (mentalising
score, max = 4)
138 1.38 (1.26) 66 2.56 (1.21) 148 1.68 (1.21) 8.20 <.001 .045 CT > TD > ASD
False-belief stories
(score, max = 10)
134 9.22 (1.34) 69 9.88 (0.47) 153 9.77 (0.69) 12.50 <.001 .066 TD, CT > ASD
ASD, autism spectrum disorder; CT, unaffected cotwins; EFT, Embedded Figures Test; M, mean average; N, number of participants;
n.s., not significant; SD, standard deviation; TD, typically developing controls.
aHigher score = poorer performance.
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the unaffected cotwins or the control group on the
EFT or on the Block Design Task. This finding is in
contrast to previous studies findings of superior
performance on the EFT and Block Design Task in
adults with ASD (Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1997;
Shah & Frith, 1983) but in line with findings from
White and Saldana (2011), who reported that chil-
dren with ASD performed similarly to typically
developing children on the EFT.
The ‘weak central coherence’ account of ASD also
suggests that individuals with ASD will have poorer
performance on tasks which place demands on
global processing compared to typically developing
children. In this study the ASD group performed
below the typically developing control group in all
three CC tasks tapping global processing, in support
of previous findings that individuals with ASD per-
form worse than typically developing individuals on
the Homographs Reading Test (Happe, 1997), Plan-
ning Drawing Task (coherence score; Booth, Charl-
ton, Hughes, & Happe, 2003) and the Sentence
Completion Task (Booth & Happe, 2010).
In support of the executive dysfunction account,
the ASD group performed below the control group in
two tasks measuring EF, specifically those purport-
ing to measure cognitive set-shifting (IDED) and
planning (Planning Drawing Task, Part B), and below
both comparison groups on a test of inhibition (Luria
Hand Game). Previous findings have also reported
poor performance by children with ASD in the Luria
Hand Game (Hughes, 1996), ID/ED (Ozonoff et al.,
2004) and the Planning Drawing task (Booth et al.,
2003). No group differences were found for the test of
generativity used in this study (Letter Fluency Task).
The ASD group performed significantly below both
comparison groups in the Penny Hiding Game,
Triangles Animation Task and the False-Belief Sto-
ries. These findings provide additional support for a
ToM deficit in ASD.
There was a mixed pattern of results regarding
whether the unaffected cotwins of those with ASD
shared cognitive features with their affected siblings.
The unaffected cotwins outperformed the ASD group
in the Sentence Completion Task (CC), Luria Hand
Game (EF) and all three ToM tasks. However, on all
other cognitive tasks (exception; Penny Hiding
Game) the unaffected cotwins were not significantly
better than the ASD group, nor significantly worse
than the control group, even when significant differ-
ences were found between the ASD and control
group. This may reflect an intermediate cognitive
profile in siblings of those with ASD, or it could be
due to a lack of statistical power to detect group




Figure 1 Performance on cognitive measures assessing (A) central
coherence, (B) executive function, and (C) theory of mind, for all
groups after accounting for IQ. Scores are presented as z-scores
relative to the control group. Error bars show standard error
Table 4 Number (percentage) of individuals with ASD, their unaffected cotwins, and controls performing atypically on cognitive
measures (defined as 1 SD above/below the control group mean)
Number of cognitive measures
in the atypical range
ASD (N = 158) Unaffected Cotwins (N = 71) Controls (N = 159)
N (%) N (%) N (%)
0 12 (7.6) 7 (9.9) 19 (11.9)
1 19 (12.0) 16 (22.5) 56 (35.2)
2 27 (17.1) 26 (36.6) 47 (29.6)
3 41 (25.9) 13 (18.3) 25 (15.7)
4 25 (15.8) 6 (8.5) 9 (5.7)
5+ 34 (21.5) 3 (4.2) 3 (1.9)
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size of the other two groups. In contrast to the
findings of Hughes, Russell, and Robbins (1994), we
did not find evidence of EF deficits in siblings of
children with ASD, nor did the siblings show weak
CC on the present tasks. There was evidence that the
broader autism phenotype included ToM deficits,
but only in the Penny Hiding Task. It should be noted
that the unaffected cotwins in fact performed sub-
stantially better in one mentalising task (Triangles
Animation Task) than both the ASD and control
groups, possibly indicating compensatory skills or
protective factors.
The ASD group had a greater number of cognitive
deficits/differences overall than both of the other
groups. This finding supplements Pellicano (2010)
study, in which children with ASD showed difficul-
ties in false-belief understanding, higher-order plan-
ning and cognitive flexibility at ages 4–7 years and
7–10 years old relative to typically developing con-
trols. Additionally, in this study, nearly a third of the
adolescents with ASD had multiple cognitive atypi-
calities, i.e. they had atypical performance in tasks
across cognitive domains. Pellicano (2010) also
found that at age 4–7 years, over half of individuals
with ASD had multiple cognitive atypicalities, which
declined to 19% by age 7-10 years. However, multi-
ple cognitive atypicalities were not exhibited by
every individual with ASD, as might be predicted
from a strong version of the fractionated triad/
multiple deficit account proposed by Happe et al.
(2006). Instead, multiple cognitive atypicalities
seem to be characteristic, but not a universal
feature, of ASD.
In this study the individuals with ASD who had
multiple cognitive atypicalities also had more severe
ASD symptomatology than those with no cognitive
atypicalities. As suggested by Happe et al. (2006),
this highlights the need to move away from single
cognitive accounts of ASD that reduce the behavio-
ural symptoms of the condition to a single underly-
ing cognitive deficit. Instead, a multiple cognitive
account of ASD, incorporating several cognitive
functions, could provide an explanation for the
symptomatology of ASD (Brunsdon & Happe, 2014;
Happe & Ronald, 2008; Happe et al., 2006). Previous
work has attempted to address whether cognitive
atypicalities, either alone or together, are related to
the behavioural features of ASD (reviewed in Bruns-
don & Happe, 2014). Only a handful of studies have
specifically investigated the relationship between
test performance in multiple cognitive tasks and
the various symptom domains of ASD (Joseph &
Tager-Flusberg, 2004; Pellicano, 2013; Pellicano
et al., 2006). Joseph and Tager-Flusberg (2004)
reported that much of the relationship between
ToM, EF and symptom severity in ASD could be
accounted for by language ability. However, ToM
ability and higher level EF were directly related to the
severity of communication symptoms in ASD, but
not to reciprocal social interaction and RRBIs. Con-
trary to Joseph and Tager-Flusberg’s (2004) findings
and their own predictions, Pellicano et al. (2006)
found that performance on CC, EF and ToM tasks
failed to correlate with any of the three symptom
domains in ASD (Pellicano et al., 2006). In a longi-
tudinal analysis, ToM ability was related to social-
communication symptoms, and EF was related to




Figure 2 Venn diagrams showing the number and percentage of
participants (A) in the ASD group, (B) the unaffected cotwin
group, and (C) the typically developing control group, with
atypical performance (1 SD above/below control group mean) in
the three cognitive domains. The central region indicates atyp-
icalities in all three cognitive domains
© 2014 The Authors. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Association for
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and CC did not relate to any symptom domains
(Pellicano, 2013). Future work is needed to resolve
conflicting results and to investigate further whether
cognitive atypicalities, either alone or together, are
related to the behavioural features of ASD contem-
poraneously or developmentally.
The SR study has many strengths; it is a large
population-based study, with an ASD group that
covers the whole ASD spectrum from those with
broader spectrum diagnoses through to those who
are severely affected, along with a large typically
developing comparison group. As the sample con-
tained siblings (i.e. the unaffected cotwins), it was
possible to investigate whether cognitive deficits are
part of the broader autism phenotype. The study
included a wide range of cognitive tasks as well as
IQ, allowing us to establish which group differences
in ToM, EF or CC survive correction for differences
in general intellectual functioning between the
groups.
Several limitations need to be considered when
reflecting upon the results of the study. First, some
potentially eligible families did not enrol in the SR
study, and as such the sample, while population-
based, is self-selected. Secondly, the adolescents
were approximately 13 years of age when they were
tested, but many of the tasks are more commonly
used to assess younger children. The task battery
was designed to assess a wide range of abilities,
given the variability of IQ in the ASD group. However,
as a result, many adolescents scored close to ceiling
on the Luria Hand Game and False-Belief Stories
and close to floor (in error scores) on the Planning
Drawing Task and Penny Hiding Game. In principle,
floor and ceiling effects constrict range and may
therefore mask true group differences. In the present
analyses, IQ was regressed out and a transformation
applied prior to analysis to reduce skewness in the
cognitive task data. Our results showed significant
group differences even in cognitive tasks that
showed some floor/ceiling effects. Thirdly, the tasks
may not have fully encapsulated the cognitive ability
that they purport to measure, and may not have
been equally discriminating across domains. For
example, there is no single task/battery that can
exhaustively measure all aspects of EF, and tests of
individual EFs are rarely ‘process pure’.
Conclusion
The present results suggest that multiple cognitive
atypicalities are characteristic, but not a universal
feature, of ASD. Several group differences were
found in cognitive tasks that are purported to test
CC, EF, and ToM. Analysis of individual performance
showed that no one deficit was universal in the ASD
group. However, participants with ASD had more
cognitive atypicalities overall than either unaffected
cotwins or typically developing control participants.
Furthermore, nearly a third of the ASD group had
multiple cognitive atypicalities, i.e. they showed
atypical performance in CC, EF and ToM. The next
step will be to investigate in this large, population-
based sample whether specific cognitive atypicali-
ties, either alone or in combination, are related to
specific behaviours characteristic of ASD.
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Key points
• The findings in the literature are somewhat mixed regarding the cognitive features of ASD.
• This study investigated a range of cognitive atypicalities and the prevalence of multiple cognitive atypicalities
in a large population-based sample comprising children with ASD, their nonclinical cotwins and typically
developing comparison children.
• The ASD group showed atypical performance in significantly more cognitive tasks than the unaffected cotwin
and control groups.
• Nearly, a third (32%) of the ASD group had multiple cognitive atypicalities compared to 11% of the unaffected
cotwins and 6% of the control group.
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